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1  | INTRODUC TION
To combat against the surge of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID- 19) 
cases and break chains of SARS- CoV- 2 transmission, many coun-
tries imposed various public health and social measures (PHSMs) 
in 2020. Especially, an unprecedented lockdown of cities, regions, 
and countries highly contributed to suppressing the virus.1 Although 
the economic loss and social burden on citizens, especially vulner-
able populations, were critically featured, there has been a dispute 
on how to leverage socioeconomic activities with infection control 
measures in many countries where suppression and/or mitigation 
strategies were employed. It has been clarified that economic activ-
ities were subdued by social distancing policy, even at a voluntary 
basis.2 On the contrary, some countries or regions in the Western 
Pacific Region, such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, or New Zealand, ad-
vanced for aggressively suppressing or eliminating COVID- 19, and 
have started to boost their socioeconomic activities.3 Australia has 
reflected on lessons learned in the winter season and advanced for 
aggressive suppression.
To contain the COVID- 19 pandemic, symptom- based strategy, 
namely testing solely for symptomatic patients under the scheme 
of clinical medicine, is not feasible due to its large proportion of as-
ymptomatic infections,4 and many countries rapidly ramped up the 
testing capacity, expanded testing targets, and arranged logistics for 
rigorous contact tracing and isolation. There has been an argument 
that weekly testing for the entire population, followed by contact 
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Abstract
To break the chains of SARS- CoV- 2 transmission and contain the coronavirus disease 
2019 (COVID- 19) pandemic, population- wide testing has been practiced in various 
countries. However, scant research has addressed this topic in Japan. In this modeling 
exercise, we extracted the number of daily reported cases of COVID- 19 in Okinawa 
from October 1 to November 30, 2020, and explored possible scenarios for decreas-
ing COVID- 19 incidence by combining population- wide screening and/or social dis-
tancing policy. We reveal that permanent lockdown can be theoretically replaced 
by mass testing but sufficient target population at an adequate frequency must be 
mobilized. In addition, solely imposing a circuit breaker will not bring a favorable out-
come in the long run, and mass testing presents implications for minimizing a period 
of lockdown. Our results highlight the importance of incentivizing citizens to join the 
frequent testing and ensure their appropriate isolation. This study also suggests that 
early containment of COVID- 19 will be feasible in prefectures where the mobility is 
low and/or can be easily controlled for its geographic characteristics. Rigorous in-
vestment in public health will be manifestly vital to contain COVID- 19.
K E Y W O R D S
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tracing and quarantine, can break chains of transmission within a 
few weeks,5 and population- wide testing has been practiced in var-
ious ways.6 China utilized a mass testing approach for early contain-
ment,7,8 and some countries in Europe launched a novel approach. 
The Slovak Republic spearheaded for screening over 3.6 million 
citizens, and mass testing with other nonpharmaceutical interven-
tions (NPIs) successfully reduced the prevalence of SARS- CoV- 2.9 
The United Kingdom firstly kicked off the trial of mass testing in 
Liverpool by a lateral flow test. In this scheme, positive cases were 
followed by confirmatory reverse transcription polymerase chain 
reaction (RT- PCR) testing.10 Other countries, such as South Tyrol/
Alto Adige in Italy, Austria and Slovenia, have already conducted or 
considered similar approaches.
While many Asian- Pacific countries have rigorously contained 
the COVID- 19, Japan has employed suppression strategy. While 
maintaining the effective reproduction number at least below 1 was 
the core in this strategy, the government did not intensify PHSMs by 
its evolution and invest in ramping up testing for diagnosis, surveil-
lance, and screening.11 Additional countermeasures and social sup-
port for high- risk environments were not strengthened,12 and failure 
in containment brought the spread of the SARS- CoV- 2 virus to the 
entire nation.13
After lifting the nationwide state of emergency in early May, 
Okinawa prefecture, whose population amounts to 1.46 million 
with 148 remote islands, aggressively suppressed the virus, and the 
number of COVID- 19 cases was maintained almost zero in May- 
June 2020; however, extensive testing for stamping out the virus 
was not implemented. This, along with the importation from other 
prefectures and COVID- 19 outbreak in US military bases, brought 
a resurgence in late July, and Okinawa necessitated local state of 
emergency in August. After the summer 2020, the grand strategy 
became obscure, which consequently made Okinawa to face an in-
crease in COVID- 19, and investigating a clear exit strategy has been 
an urgent research topic for protecting lives and livelihoods of citi-
zens. The purpose of this study is to explore possible scenarios for 
decreasing its incidence by combining population- wide testing and/
or social distancing policy.
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Model
Our basic model, an SEIQR compartmental model, is shown in 
Figure 1, in which the susceptible (S), exposed (asymptomatic infec-
tious; (E), infectious (I), quarantined (Q), and removed (R) populations 
are considered.
In this model, β1 and β2 imply the asymptomatic and symptom-
atic infection rates, respectively.14,15 ε, γ, and η imply the transition 
rates from E to I, I to R, and Q to R, respectively. That is, 1/ε, 1/γ, 
and 1/η imply the average periods of incubation, infection, and 
quarantine, respectively. We assumed that the unit time is 1 day 
and 1/ε = 5 (days), 1/γ = 10 (days), and 1/η = 14 (days) as shown 
in Figure 116.,17,18. As in Ref.,14 we assumed that the reproduc-
tion numbers for asymptomatic and symptomatic infections are 
R1 = 0.44R and R2 = 0.56R, respectively,
15 where R denotes the 
reproduction number for COVID- 19 in Okinawa, and β1 and β2 are 
given by β1 = εR1 = 0.44εR and β2 = γR2 = 0.56γR, respectively. k 
is the diagnosis rate per capita per day in the whole population of 
Okinawa. We assumed that 0.05% (k = 0.0005) of the whole pop-
ulation of Okinawa can be diagnosed per day and only the exposed 
(E) and infectious (I) individuals can be detected with sensitivity 
P = 0.9,19 and transferred to the quarantined (Q) class. δ is the 
identification rate of infectious individuals. We assumed that the 
infectious individuals will be removed after the identification, and 
hence, (1 − δ)γI implies the density of newly removed individuals 
without identification. We chose the initial condition as S + E + 
I + Q + R = 1 so that each population implies the proportion to 
the total population. As shown in Figure 1, we can then regard 
Y = P[δγI + kp(E + I)] as the number of newly reported cases, where 
P = 1.45 × 106 denotes the total population in Okinawa.20 By fit-
ting Y to the actual data of COVID- 19 in Okinawa from October 1 
to November 30, 2020, by the least square method applied else-
where,21,22 we estimated the reproduction number R for Okinawa 
in this term as 1.21. The estimated epidemic curve and validation 
of the estimation can be seen in the top- left of Figures, in which 
F I G U R E  1   Transfer diagram, 
equations, and parameter table for our 
basic SEIQR model
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the blue curve represents the estimated epidemic curve, the red 
dots represent the data from October 1 to November 30, 2020, 
which was used for the estimation, and the green dots represent 
the actual data from December 1, 2020, to January 31, 2021.
2.2 | Multiple scenarios
We simulated multiple scenarios under the assumption that the 
pulsed mass testing, a public health screening to recognize in-
fected individuals, and social distancing policy for decreasing 
social contacts started on December 8, 2020. On the mass test-
ing, we assumed that the testing is periodically carried out per 
7/14/30 days to 5/25/50% of the susceptible and exposed popula-
tions in Okinawa. On the other hand, we also simulated a case that 
the daily self- testing is carried out on weekdays to 1/5/10% of the 
susceptible and exposed populations in Okinawa. For simplicity, in 
the mass testing, we assumed a perfect test sensitivity for detect-
ing asymptomatic infectious individuals9, regardless of specificity 
and compliance with quarantine. We obtained four scenarios  for 
the following cases.
1. Mass testing with testing rate 5% per 7/14/30 days;
2. Mass testing with testing rate 25% per 7/14/30 days;
3. Mass testing with testing rate 50% per 7/14/30 days;
4. Daily self- testing with testing rate 1/5/10%.
In addition, in each scenario, we considered three cases of so-
cial distancing policies that decreased social contacts by 50%, and 
their duration was classified into three patterns: no lockdown, circuit 
breaker where the lockdown ends after 4 weeks, and the permanent 
lockdown.
3  | RESULTS
Multiple scenarios of mass testing toward 5%, 25%, and 50% of 
whole population in Okinawa at different intervals are presented in 
Figures 2- 4. The number of daily reported cases will exponentially 
increase without mass testing or lockdown. While imposing the cir-
cuit breaker can curb the epidemic, it is not sufficient to aggressively 
suppress the virus; therefore, to decrease the number of patients, 
mass testing at appropriate intervals must be combined. The per-
manent lockdown will decrease COVID- 19 cases, and its period will 
be shortened by simultaneously implementing mass testing. Figure 2 
clearly exhibits that mass testing for 5% of all citizens in Okinawa is 
not sufficient to curb an increasing number of daily reported cases, 
even when mass testing is conducted on a weekly basis or combined 
with circuit breaker.
This tendency slightly changes when 25% of whole population 
in Okinawa are screened, as presented in Figure 3. When the lock-
down is not a policy option, mass testing per 7 days will alleviate an 
increasing trend; however, each mass testing continuously reports 
F I G U R E  2   Evolution of daily reported COVID- 19 cases when population- wide testing is performed for 5% of all citizens at specific 
intervals. (A) No lockdown, (B) circuit breaker, and (C) permanent lockdown
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F I G U R E  3   Evolution of daily reported COVID- 19 cases when population- wide testing is performed for 25% of all citizens at specific 
intervals. (A) No lockdown, (B) circuit breaker, and (C) permanent lockdown
F I G U R E  4   Evolution of daily reported COVID- 19 cases when population- wide testing is performed for 50% of all citizens at specific 
intervals. (A) No lockdown, (B) circuit breaker, and (C) permanent lockdown
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more than 100 cases for several months. When implementing mass 
testing per 7 days, an increasing trend will be reversed; however, it 
must be debatable in terms of health system capacity. Obviously, a 
frequent testing combined with social distancing policy will hugely 
contribute to breaking chains of transmission and vividly decreasing 
the reported number of COVID- 19 per mass testing. When com-
bined with the circuit breaker, the daily reported number of cases 
will be decreased to below 20 in early January.
Figure 4 illustrates scenarios of mass testing that targets 50% of 
all citizens. Monthly mass testing will alleviate an increasing trend, 
but daily reported number of cases will amount to around 100 in 
April. Mass testing per 14 days will truly curb the epidemic, and the 
decreasing trend will be accelerated by simultaneously imposing a 
circuit breaker. When the weekly mass testing is performed without 
lockdown, it will promptly impact on crashing transmission dynam-
ics and record less than 10 cases in late February. This period can 
be shortened to early January when combined with circuit breaker. 
Figure 4A,C also suggests that weekly mass testing for 50% of entire 
population will not only overturn an increasing trend of COVID- 19 
patients but also bring a continuous decrease of patients, which is 
gained by simply imposing a permanent lockdown.
Figure 5 presents the evolution of daily reported cases when 
the testing is conducted on a daily basis. Our results show that daily 
testing toward 1% of all citizens is not sufficient to hammer an in-
creasing trend of daily reported cases without permanent lockdown. 
When 5% of all citizens are targeted, the number of reported cases 
will gradually decrease but it will record over 100 cases for several 
months. When 10% of all citizens were tested on a daily basis, the 
number of daily reported cases will reach below 100 in late February. 
When combined with circuit breaker, daily testing toward 1% of all 
citizens is not enough to turn the tide, but expanding more than 5% 
of all citizens will be effective to decrease the number of daily re-
ported cases.
4  | DISCUSSION
This study employed an SEIQR compartmental model to incorporate 
an impact of testing, isolation, and quarantine, which are primary pil-
lars for source control management and critical to contain infectious 
diseases. Our modeling exercise briefly revealed three major find-
ings. First, there were scenarios in Okinawa that regular population- 
wide testing could curb an increasing trend of COVID- 19 patients 
and permanent lockdown could be averted, when properly organ-
ized and managed. As shown in green dots, maintaining the current 
test- trace- isolate (TTI) schemes was not enough to contain the de-
teriorating epidemiological situation of COVID- 19 pandemic, and 
thus, mobilizing sufficient target population for mass testing would 
be vital. Monthly screening would not bring a decrease in COVID- 19 
infections, and ensuring adequate frequencies would be necessary. 
F I G U R E  5   Evolution of daily reported COVID- 19 cases when population- wide testing is performed on a daily basis. (A) No lockdown, (B) 
circuit breaker, and (C) permanent lockdown
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Second, mass testing presented implications for minimizing a period 
of lockdown. Third, to truly reverse an increasing trend of COVID- 19, 
circuit breaker, namely a short- term lockdown, must be combined 
with population- wide screening for sufficient population. Solely 
imposing a circuit breaker and slacking investment in TTI systems 
would not bring favorable outcomes in the long term.
Our results are in line with other several evidence. As presymp-
tomatic and asymptomatic infections heavily contribute to the 
whole transmission of SARS- CoV- 2,23 intervening these infections 
through regular essential medical services (ie, testing for symptom-
atic patients) is challenging. Considering the natural history of SARS- 
CoV- 2 infection24 and high transmissibility from asymptomatic or 
presymptomatic infections,15,25 capturing these infected individuals 
is a critical topic. In fact, some universities in the United States have 
already started to implement a frequent, intensive screening test by 
RT- PCR.26- 28 In addition, the necessity of frequent use of rapid, inex-
pensive tests, which can be positive for patients with infectiousness, 
has been critically argued in the United States,29,30 and modeling 
studies support this presumption.31,32 While Japan urgently needs 
to expand the testing capacity of RT- qPCR for diagnosis, surveil-
lance, and screening, using appropriate rapid testing kits for detect-
ing highly transmissible patients can be considered when the testing 
capacity is overwhelmed. Although debatable, utilizing rapid testing 
tools for entry screening toward several high- risk environments, 
such as full- service restaurants and gathering events, may help 
prevent superspreading events. Moreover, our results indicate that 
implementing a population- wide screening during a period of social 
distancing policy will accelerate a decreasing trend of SARS- CoV- 2 
infection. While this study assumed that only people tested positive 
would be isolated because the tracing capacity in Japan has already 
been overwhelmed and technical issues in contact tracing app. has 
been reported, utilizing a population- wide screening as an opportu-
nity for mass isolation and quarantine will aggressively reduce the 
transmission. In fact, a recent case study from the Slovak Republic9 
suggested that population- wide screening, even conducted only a 
few times, was beneficial for detecting COVID- 19 patients, appro-
priately isolating people who were tested positive, quarantining 
their close contacts, and breaking chains of transmission. If managed 
appropriately, this approach can contribute to minimizing the period 
of lockdown, thus mitigating the impact of social distancing policy on 
socioeconomic activities.
The COVID- 19 pandemic explicitly suggests that health is a foun-
dation of society.33 As investment in public health, especially ramp-
ing up testing, will strengthen national health security and contribute 
to raising preparedness for other health emergencies in the near 
future, and a lower quality of life and death because of COVID- 19 
are measured as economic loss,34 to what extent investing in public 
health infrastructure will positively work in containing the pandemic 
and revitalizing socioeconomic activities should be discussed from 
interdisciplinary perspectives. It should be also noted that fear for 
COVID- 19 among citizens will work as a big threat to the economy 
compared with several public health and social measures for pre-
venting the spread of infection.35,36 In fact, Okinawa faced a falling 
demand of 186.7 billion yen after the first wave of COVID- 1937 and 
that finally amounted at a scale of 648.2 billion yen in 2020.38 In 
entire Japan, the economy suffered from over 30 trillion yen.39 On 
the contrary, economies of scale have been positively working for 
reducing the price of PCR testing. Healthy Davis Together project 
in California, the United States, achieved a $6 for single test,40 and 
similar tendencies have been recognized in Japan. Introduction of 
pooling strategy, which has already been introduced in other coun-
tries,41- 43 was finally approved in Japan in early 2021. It will further 
decrease the cost of testing. Generally, investment in public health 
will bring economic gain at several scales,34 because investment 
in public health will cost on millions of dollars but economic loss 
because of failure in containment will bring an economic loss at a 
scale of trillions of dollars.34 Advantages of minimizing economic 
loss by elimination strategy compared with suppression strategy 
have already been modeled,44 and a call for COVID- 19 elimination 
in Japan has been openly discussed.13 These windows of opportu-
nities should be fully utilized. At the same time, several operational 
challenges must be noted. First, incentivizing public participation will 
be exigent. Discrimination against COVID- 19 patients; stigmatization 
toward workers in specific industries, such as health care, nightlife, 
and catering13,45; and insufficient capacity in health communication 
will be eminent barriers for citizens to understand why mass testing 
contributes to protect the health of individuals and others. Second, 
a limited testing capacity and weak logistics in procuring personal 
protective equipment will be demanding. As public health centers in 
Japan have already been overwhelmed due to COVID- 19 pandemic, 
outsourcing its role for testing, fully utilizing academic laboratories, 
and incorporating testing capacities in private sectors will be vital. 
Third, the feasibility of mass screening schemes is completely differ-
ent by context.46 A higher sensitivity for screening test is warranted, 
but using appropriate testing kits for truly recognizing infectiousness 
based on the previous discussion47 can be an option, especially when 
several challenges in gold standard testing, such as limited capacities 
of nucleic acid amplification test and prolonged turnaround times of 
testing results, remain unsolved. However, how to measure the in-
fectiousness is a challenging question, as there is no clear threshold 
in defining infectiousness which presents a continuous trend. While 
lower values of cycle threshold seem to link with detecting culturable 
virus and higher chances of generating secondary cases,48- 51 care-
ful interpretations of oversimplified modeling assumptions are war-
ranted. Scant independent evaluations from real- world data, several 
case reports that present lower sensitivity especially among asymp-
tomatic cases, questionable workability of home- based approaches 
because of differences in sampling methods, procurement and de-
ployment of these tools, logistics for registering the data, and nega-
tive impacts of rapid testing results on modifying people's behaviors 
including false sense of security among citizens, breaking chains 
of COVID- 19, and protecting asymptomatic and presymptomatic 
COVID- 19 patients before their symptoms of onset will be eminent 
challenges.52- 56 Discussing the feasibility in each context, summariz-
ing advantages and disadvantages of testing tools for public health 
purposes, and intervals of mass testing will be vital research topics 
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during COVID- 19 pandemic. While the false- positive result was not a 
critical matter in population- wide screening in the Slovak Republic,9 
whether the population- wide screening should use PCR testing or 
combined with rapid tests will be different between contexts and 
should be openly discussed. Fourth, our results suggest that mass 
testing will detect a number of patients. Therefore, there is an im-
mense necessity of procuring isolation facilities. Launching shelter 
hospitals should be considered. These will not only work for truly 
breaking chains of transmission and avoiding additional transmissions 
(eg, household transmission), but lessen additional burden on tertiary 
referral hospitals. Fifth, social support, including financial scheme for 
positive cases, must be ensured with a political will to contain the 
pandemic. This is crucial to truly achieve a high compliance of isola-
tion. Expanding the public support toward close contacts of patients 
who need to be quarantined will improve their compliance.
There are several limitations in this modeling exercise. First, the 
heterogeneity of COVID- 19 infection is not considered. The heteroge-
neity of the offspring distribution of secondary infection of COVID- 19 
was recognized,57,58 and intervention in high- risk environments will be 
effective for preventing superspreading events.59 We launched this 
modeling exercise with concerns that extensive testing for contain-
ment has been rejected by scientific advisors,13 and a great number 
of essential workers, even healthcare workers at hospitals and nursing 
homes, still cannot access to regular protective screening in Japan.12 A 
random population- wide testing was assumed on this modeling exer-
cise, but opportunities for population- wide testing will be beneficial for 
containing COVID- 19 and ensuring access to testing among citizens. 
Strategically mobilizing symptomatic patients and presymptomatic 
patients with minor symptoms of COVID- 19 for this opportunity will 
accelerate for advancing to containment. Second, the management of 
prefectural borders is not considered. However, as Okinawa prefec-
ture has no land bridge except the US Military Bases and Facilities on 
Okinawa Island and Its Vicinity, test- based strategy at its prefectural 
border can be easily implemented compared with other prefectures. 
Third, our modeling did not strongly address the importance of contact 
tracing. While this assumption is plausible in that the tracing capacity 
in public health centers was sometimes overwhelmed in Japan,11,60 
population- wide testing followed by contact tracing activities, even 
limited ones, will contribute to further decreasing the transmission. 
Utilizing population- wide screening as an opportunity for mass isola-
tion can be a political option. Fourth, we assumed that the lockdown 
would decrease social contacts by 50%. Considering that the state of 
emergency in Japan in April has been declared under the assumption 
that social contacts will be decreased between 70% and 80%,11 our 
assumptions can be strengthened. Finally and importantly, securing 
sufficient resources will be discussed as major challenges. In those 
circumstances, promptly imposing a social distancing policy and em-
ploying targeted approaches based on the surveillance data will be al-
ternative options. For example, results of wastewater surveillance for 
COVID- 19 need to be fully incorporated for containment efforts.
Despite these limitations, our modeling exercise presented several 
implications for the deteriorating situation of COVID- 19 in Okinawa, 
Japan. To end this pandemic, revive socioeconomic activities and 
protect citizens' lives and livelihoods, rigorous investment in public 
health is manifestly vital.34,61 Testing obviously plays a vital role in con-
taining the virus, and aggressive, widespread testing can capture more 
asymptomatic cases. Actually, countries advanced for near- elimination 
conducted more testing per case.62 Population- wide screening has 
been previously practiced for early containment or elimination,7,8 and 
some countries in Europe started to employ this approach with their 
own social distancing policies. Our exercise implies that repeated mass 
testing that targets sufficient population will be a policy option to avoid 
the lockdown. However, it is easily expected that there are several chal-
lenges for promptly conducting a mass testing; in those circumstances, 
early introduction of a tight circuit breaker for saving time to build solid 
foundation of logistics for mass screening will be critical. In addition to 
expanding the testing capacity and ensuring citizens' access to testing, 
critical roles of extensive screening must be reconsidered for promptly 
detecting and protecting COVID- 19 patients, breaking further trans-
mission dynamics, and containing the pandemic.
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